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D.H. LAWRENCE finished writing Lady Chatterley's Lover in Florence,
Italy, in 1928.1 Importation of the novel was barred on grounds of obscenity
in both the United States and England, but there was a substantial under-
ground circulation in pirated editions and smuggled copies, and the book
became one of the most widely discussed "banned" works of this century.
Thirty-one years were to pass, however, before the novel as Lawrence finally
wrote it was to become generally available to the public in this country.2 In
July, 1959, a federal district court overturned a decision by the Postmaster
General who had refused to transmit the book through the mails. 3 In Eng-
land, fifteen months later, in October, 1960, a jury returned a verdict of not
guilty in a criminal prosecution which had been instituted under the Obscene
Publications Act of 1959 4 against Penguin Books Limited who had published
the novel in Great Britain. Lady Chatterley's Lover promptly became a best
seller in both countries.
To commemorate its legal triumph, Penguin published the book under
review: The Trial of Lady Chatterley. It is, in essence, the transcript of the
trial in England. Unfortunately, it is not the verbatim text; the transcript
appears to have been substantially edited. But the book contains much of the
opening and closing statements by counsel, the court's charge to the jury, and
a good deal of the testimony. The editor, C.H. Rolph, a member of the
Committee of the Society of Authors who played an important role in secur-
ing legislative reform in England of the law governing obscenity, is plainly
not an unbiased commentator. His editorial asides are heavily weighted in
favor of the defendant. Nonetheless, the book makes fascinating reading. It
is a valuable addition to the legal literature on censorship and a fitting
monument to a great case.
1. See ALDINGTON, PORTRAIT OF A GEmIus, BUT . . . 320 (1950) ; Letter, Lawrence to
Martin Secker, March 5, 1928, in THE SEcTFD LEttERs OF D. H. LAWRENCE 273 (Trilling
ed. 1958).
2. Lawrence wrote three versions of Lady Chatterley's Lover. See Schorer, Bibl~o-
graphical Note, in LAWRENCE, LADY CHATTERLEY's LOVER 367 (Grove Press ed. 1959). The
first version was published in the United States in 1944 under the title The First Lady Chat-
terley. The second version has never been published. An expurgated edition of the third
version was published in this country in 1932. The third version contains the four-letter
words, omitted from the earlier drafts. Its publication led to the litigation discussed in this
essay.
3. Grove Press, Inc. v. Christenberry, 175 F. Supp. 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), aff'd, 276
F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1960).
4. 7 & 8 Eliz. 2, c. 66.
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The publication of The Trial of Lady Chatterley invites a comparative
analysis of the American and English proceedings with respect to Lawrence's
novel-a consideration, that is, of the way in which the two legal systems
broached a common problem. In addition, the book inspires appraisal of the
various trial techniques available to the defense given a charge of obscenity,
specifically, the use of expert witnesses. Finally, the book underscores the
difficulties connected with the use of the judicial process for the purpose of
adjudicating issues so elusive, so subtle, and so freighted with emotional im-
pact as "obscenity" and "literary merit."
I
When Lawrence died in 1930, he was regarded as one of the most im-
portant English writers of his time. His reputation has grown steadily in the
years that followed. E.M. Forster has described him as "the greatest imagina-
tive novelist of [my] generation."5 The literary merits of this particular
novel by Lawrence have been warmly debated by critics. There are those who,
like Archibald MacLeish, regard it as "one of the most important works of
fiction of the century ;-6 there are some who think it "crude and strident,"
"tediously discursive," and an artistic failure ;' and there are others, such as
Colin Welch, an English critic, who "while conceding that Lady Chatterley is
a work of great literary merit, indeed of dark, magical, and terrible beauty,
nevertheless believe it to be a profoundly immoral or even evil work." In
any event, it is obvious that the suppression of a book of this character by
an author of Lawrence's immense stature poses questions of censorship in an
acute form.
The legal difficulties of the novel stemmed first from Lawrence's use of
normally unprintable four-letter Anglo-Saxon words. Lawrence was an evan-
gelist for candor in the discussion of sexual matters.9 In an essay he wrote in
1929, Lawrence observed that "gradually all the old words that belong to the
body below the navel have come to be judged obscene."'1 "What is obvious,"
he wrote, "is that the words in these cases have been dirtied by the mind, by
unclean mental associations. The words themselves are clean, so are the things
to which they apply." 11 He felt that "The simple and 'natural' obscene words
must be cleaned up of all their depraved fear associations and readmitted into
the consciousness to take their natural place."' 2 Lawrence undertook in Lady
5. See ROLPH, THE TRiAL OF LADY CHATTERLEY 112 (1961) [hereinafter cited as
The Trial].
6. MacLeish, in LAWRENcE, LADY CHATTER Y's LovER vi (Grove Press ed. 1959).
7. The Censor as Aedile, The London Times Literary Supplement, Aug. 4, 1961, p.
475. See also Katherine Anne Porter, A Wreath for the Gamekeeper, 14 Encounter 69
(Feb. 1960) ; Shonfield, Lawrence's Other Censor, 17 Encounter 63 (Sept. 1961).
8. Welch, Black Magic, White Lies, 16 Encounter 75 (Feb. 1961).
9. See e.g., Lawrence's famous essay, "Pornography and Obscenity," in LAWRENCE,
SmCEcTED LrrERARY Cmatcism 32 (1955).
10. Lawrence, "Introduction to Pansies," id. at 27-28.
11. Id. at28.
12. Id. at 29.
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Chatterley's Lover to redeem the four-letter words by using them in a
serious context. Apart from the four-letter words and the vivid description of
the sexual act, the book was a target for censors because of its treatment of
the theme of adultery.13 "It sets upon a pedestal promiscuous and adulterous
intercourse," counsel for the Crown told the jury in England."4 Lawrence be-
lieved that industrialization had sapped much of English life of vitality and
led to inhibited and artificial sexual relations lacking in tenderness. His story
of the love affair between the impotent, aristocratic mine-owner's wife and
his game-keeper was designed to give artistic expression to this theme.
The American case involving Lady Chatterley's Lover had its genesis early
in 1959 when Grove Press, a reputable American publishing firm, decided to
publish an unexpurgated edition of the novel in this country. On May 6, 1959,
Grove Press was notified that twenty-four parcels containing copies of the novel
were being withheld from dispatch by the Postmaster at New York City on the
grounds that there was probable cause for believing the book was "nonmailable
under the provisions of [the federal obscenity statute] t ... in that said book is
obscene, lewd, lascivious, indecent and filthy in character and content, and that
its dominant effect and theme is such as to appeal to the prurient interest."1 6
Twenty thousand advertising circulars for the book, deposited for mailing by
Readers Subscription, Inc., who had obtained the book club rights, were also
detained in the Post Office at about the same time on the theory that the
circulars gave information where obscene material could be obtained. 17 Grove
Press denied that the book was obscene or that its dominant effect was de-
signed to appeal to prurient interests, and it maintained that if the book were
nonmailable, its free speech and property rights would be abridged in violation
of the first and fifth amendments . 8 An administrative hearing was held be-
13. In June, 1959, the Supreme Court held that a motion picture, based upon Lady
Chatterley's Lover and bearing the same title, could not constitutionally be denied a
license by a state film censorship board. Kingsley Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S.
684 (1959). A New York statute permitted refusal of a license to an "immmorar' film
which was defined by the statute as a motion picture "which portrays acts of sexual im-
morality . . . as desirable, acceptable or proper patterns of behavior." Id. at 685. The
exhibitor had been denied a license on grounds that the "whole theme of this motion
picture is immoral" because the "theme is the presentation of adultery as a desirable,
acceptable and proper pattern of behavior." Ibid. The Supreme Court concluded that
censorship of a film on this ground could not be reconciled with the first amendment.
14. The Trial at 17.
15. 69 Stat. 183 (1955), 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1958).
16. Letter from General Counsel, Fraud and Mailability Section, U.S. Post Office, to
Postmaster, New York City, N.Y., May 6, 1959, on file In the Matter of Grove Press Inc.,
Post Office Docket M-16 (1959).
17. See Order, May 28, 1959, on file In the Matter of Grove Press Inc., Post Office
Docket M-16 (1959).
18. See letter, Charles Rembar to Herbert D. Warburton, May 11, 1959, on file In
the Matter of Grove Press Inc., Post Office Docket M-16 (1959). Readers Subscription
acknowledged that a ruling holding the book to be nonmailable would be dispositive of
its rights to mail the circulars advertising the book. Id., Transcript of Hearing, p. 5, (May
14, 1959).
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fore a judicial officer of the Post Office.19 Subsequently, the Postmaster Gen-
eral, following (as he thought) the tests of obscenity promulgated by the
Supreme Court in 1957 in Roth v. United States 21--"whether to the average
person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of
the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest"4-ruled that the
book was obscene and, therefore, nonmailable.
22
Grove Press and Readers Subscription promptly petitioned the District
Court for the Southern District of New York for an injunction to restrain
enforcement of the decision and for a declaratory judgment that the book was
not obscene. 23 The government contended that the decision of the Postmaster
General was conclusive unless shown to be clearly erroneous. The district
court, however, declined to give special deference to the administrative deter-
mination: "The Postmaster General has no special competence or technical
knowledge on this subject which qualifies him to render an informed judg-
ment entitled to special weight in the courts. '24 The court then went on to
hold that Lady Chatterley's Lover, judged by the standards laid down in
the 1934 decision involving James Joyce's novel Ulysses 2G and the Supreme
Court's opinion in Roth, was not obscene. In setting aside the decision of the
Postmaster General as "contrary to law and clearly erroneous," the court said
that "to interpret the obscenity statute so as to bar 'Lady Chatterley's
Lover' from the mails would render the statute unconstitutional in its applica-
tion, in violation of the guarantees of freedom of speech and the press contained
in the First Amendment. '26 On appeal, the order of the district court en-
19. The Judicial Officer made no preliminary decision, as is customary, on grounds that
a ruling holding "the book to be mailable would require a reversal of rulings of long stand-
ing by this Department and . . . cast doubt on the rullings of a coordinate executive de-
partment", i.e., the Treasury which barred importation of the book. He referred the matter
to the Postmaster General for decision. Order, May 28, 1959, on file In the Matter of
Grove PressInc., Post Office Docket M-16 (1959).
20. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
21. Id. at 489.
22. Departmental Decision, June 11, 1959, on file In the Matter of Grove Press Inc.,
Post Office Docket M-16 (1959). He articulated the rationale of his decision as follows:
The contemporary community standards are not such that this book should be
allowed to be transmitted in the mails.
The book is replete with descriptions in minute detail of sexual acts engaged in or
discussed by the book's principal characters. These descriptions utilize filthy, of-
fensive, and degrading words and terms. Any literary merit the book may have is
far outweighed by the pornographic and smutty passages and words, so that the
book, taken as a whole, is an obscene and filthy work.
Ibid.
23. Grove Press, Inc. v. Christenberry, 175 F. Supp. 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), aff'd, 276
F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1960).
24. 175 F. Supp. at 495. See Note, 73 HA.v. L. REv. 583 (1960).
25. United States v. One Book "Ulysses," 5 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1933), aft'd, 72
F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1934).
26. 175 F. Supp. at 503.
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joining enforcement was sustained by a unanimous court.27 When the govern-
ment elected not to seek review in the Supreme Court, the case in this
country was at an end.
In England, on July 29, 1959, eight days after the district court's opinion
was announced in the United States, the Royal Assent was given to a new
statute which had been passed by Parliament in order, as its preamble recited,
"to provide for the protection of literature and to strengthen the law concern-
ing pornography."' 28 The Obscene Publications Act of 1959 was the end pro-
duct of years of agitation in England for reform in the law governing obscen-
ity.29 Among other changes,30 the act made an important revision in the
standard of obscenity formulated in 1868 by Lord Cockburn in Queen v.
Hicklin.31 The 1959 Act provides that the test is whether the effect of the
work "if taken as a whole, [is] such as is likely to deprave or corrupt per-
sons who are likely, having regard to all relevant circumstances, to read, see,
or hear the matter contained or embodied in it."' 32 The act also creates a new
substantive defense: "A person shall not be convicted of an offense against
... this Act... if it is proved that publication of the article in question is
justified as being for the public good on the ground that it is in the interests of
science, literature, art or learning, or of other objects of general concern.
'33
The English law thus gives explicit recognition to the aesthetic insight that a
book may be both obscene and of literary merit.3 4 The statute further declares
that "the opinions of experts as to literary, artistic, scientific, or other merits
of an article may be admitted in any proceedings under this Act either to
establish or to negate the said ground." 35 In other words, the English statute
permits expert testimony, theretofore inadmissible, 36 with respect to the literary
27. Grove Press, Inc. v. Christenberry, 276 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1960).
23. Obscene Publications Act, 1959, 7 & 8 Eliz. 2, c. 66.
29. See A.P. Herbert, Introduction in ST. JOHN-STEVAS, OBSCENITY AND THE LAW
(1956).
30. For a detailed discussion of the changes made by the 1959 Act, see, e.g., Williams,
The Obscene Publications Act, 1959, 23 MODERN L. Rzv. 285 (1960) ; Clark, Obscenity,
The Law and Lady Chatterley-I, CRIm. L. REv. (Eng.) 157 (March 1961).
31. L.R. 3 Q.B. 360, 371 (1868) : "[W]hether the tendency of the matter charged as
obscenity is to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral in-
fluences and into whose hands a publication of this sort may fall." Under this standard, the
effect of isolated passages of a work upon the immature and the abnormal was a legitimate
criterion for judging obscenity. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 488-89 (1957);
ST. JO rN-STEVAs, OBscENITY AND THE LAW 128 (1956).
32. Obscene Publications Act, 1959, 7 & 8 Eliz. 2, c. 66, § 1 (1).
33. Id., § 4(1).
34. See Kaplan, Obscenity as an Aesthetic Category, 20 LAw & CONTEmp. PROB. 544
(1955).
35. Obscene Publications Act, 1959, 7 & 8 Eliz. 2, c. 66, § 4(2).
36. In the 1928 prosecution of Radclyffe Hall's The Well of Loneliness, the court held
that testimony by experts designed to show that the work would not have a tendency to
corrupt or deprave was inadmissible. The defense offered to tender forty witnesses, in-
cluding distinguished authors, Professor Julius Huxley, clergymen, and physicians, among
others. See St. JOHN-STEVAS, OBSCENITY AND THE LAW 101-02 (1956).
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or other merits of a book challenged as obscene, but leaves it to the jury to
decide whether, in light of the merits weighed against the alleged obscenity,
publication is for the common good. The act contemplates that if the jury
feels the book is not obscene the matter is at an end, but if it believes the
book is in fact obscene, it is then obliged to consider if its publication is
justified by literary or other merit.
After the statute was passed, Penguin reached the decision to observe the
thirtieth anniversary of Lawrence's death in 1960 by publishing six of his
novels, including an unexpurgated edition of Lady Chatterley's Lover.37 The
company acknowledged that it was influenced in this decision by the new
statute and the rulings favorable to the book in the United States.38 When
it became clear in August, 1960, that a prosecution would be instituted if the
book were published, Penguin had twelve copies of the book delivered to a
Scotland Yard inspector.3 9 This act constituted "publication" within the mean-
ing of the Obscene Publications Act; it set the stage for a test case. A sum-
mons was duly issued and in October, 1960, the case came to trial in the
Central Criminal Court in London.
The prosecution maintained that the book "sets upon a pedestal promis-
cuous and adulterous intercourse. It commends, and indeed it sets out to com-
mend, sensuality almost as a virtue. It encourages and indeed even advocates,
coarseness and vulgarity of thought and of language .... [I]t must tend to
deprave the minds certainly of some and you [the jury] may think many of
the persons who are likely to buy it .... 40 The defense, on the other hand,
contended that, viewed as a whole, the novel "would not tend to deprave or
corrupt anyone," and that, in any event, even if it were prima facie obscene
the literary and other qualities of the work were such that it was in the public
good that it should be published.41 As noted above, the jury found for the de-
fendant.
II
There are a number of obvious points of difference between the proceedings
in the two countries. In the United States, the case originated in an adminis-
trative action and was civil throughout.4 The English case was a criminal
prosecution, tried to a jury. The American case was carried on within a
constitutional framework; the principal arguments on points of law were
couched in terms of limitations on the government's power under the first
37. See Clark, Obscenity, The Law and Lady Chatterley-II, CanMx. L. Rnv. (Eng.)
224-25 (April 1961).
38. The Trial at 142.
39. Id. at 1-2.
40. Id. at 17.
41. Id. at 33.
42. An obscenity case in this country may also originate as an injunction proceeding
in a court of equity, Kingsley Books v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436 (1957), or as a criminal
prosecution in either the federal or state courts. E.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476
(1957) ; Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959).
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amendment to censor the book.43 While the theme of free speech was by no
means absent from the English proceeding, it was not the cornerstone of the
defense as it was in this country. There was a sharp disparity in the dispatch
with which the proceedings were concluded. In England, there was a six-day
trial, a verdict was reached by a jury, and the case was at an end. In this
country, on the other hand, the case was first tried to a judicial officer within
the Post Office; all of the testimony was received in a single day. The case
was then decided by the Postmaster General on the basis of the record. It was
thereafter argued on points of law in the district court and again before the
court of appeals. In short, the final decision in England was made by a jury,
presumably on the basis of the elaborate testimony; in this country, the final
decision was made by judges primarily on the basis of argument as to points
of law.
In England, the test of obscenity was whether the work would "deprave and
corrupt"; in this country, the applicable standard was whether the book "ap-
peals to prurient interest." There is a theoretical difference in these two tests
but there was no important practical difference as the tests were applied in
these two cases. 44 In England, a statute explicitly makes literary merit a
possible justification. In this country, there is in effect a judge-made excep-
tion for "classics" or works of conspicuous excellence. 45
But the foregoing differences, whether real or simply theoretical, should
not be permitted to obscure a number of fundamental similarities in the two
proceedings. The governmental authorities in both countries conceded that
Lady Chatterley's Lover had some literary merit. "Let me at once concede,"
43. Justice Douglas has stated that English law and practice with respect to obscenity
have "little relevance to our problem, since we live under a written Constitution. What
is entrusted to the keeping of the legislature in England is protected from legislative inter-
ference or regulation here." Kingsley Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684, 698 (1959)
(concurring opinion). Contrast concurring opinions by Frankfurter, J., id. at 693-94; Smith
v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 166-67 (1959).
44. "Appeals to prurient interests" refers to "qualities of the material itself: the
capacity to attract individuals eager for a forbidden look." See MODEL PENAL CODE §
207.10(2), comments (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1957). On the other hand, "corrupt or deprave"
implies that a change of character or actual misconduct follows from contact with obscenity.
In Regina v. Penguin, the trial judge instructed the jury that "to deprave means to make
morally bad, to pervert, to debase, or corrupt morally. The words 'to corrupt' mean to
render morally unsound or rotten, to destroy the moral purity or chasity of, to pervert or
ruin a good quality, to debase, to defile." The Trial at 227-28. There would be a significant
practical difference in the two tests if the prosecution were required to prove under the
"corrupt and deprave" standard that persons were in fact perverted by reading the book, or
if the defense were permitted to introduce expert testimony to establish that no such
consequences follow from reading a book. The trial judge in the Penguin case ruled, how-
ever, that proof of publication standing alone establishes an intent to deprave or corrupt
and that the defense cannot introduce testimony to show that the book does not have this
consequence. The Trial at 126-27.
45. See United States v. Roth, 237 F.2d 796, 819-20 (2d Cir. 1956); Kalven, The
Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, Sup. CT. REv. 1, 13 (1960).
1962] 1357
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
counsel for the Crown said in his opening address, "that D.H. Lawrence is
a well recognized and indeed great writer. Let me at once concede, but per-
haps not to so great an extent, that there may be some literary merit in this
book."'46 Counsel for the Post Office made a similar concession: "We do not
contend that Lawrence is a writer without standing or that his efforts in Lady
Chatterley's Lover lack any literary merit."47 The contention by governmental
authorities in both countries, however, was that the book's dominant effect
was obscene and outweighed its literary merit. Further, in both countries,
the government simply introduced the book and then rested its case. Proof of
publication constituted a prima facie case. Neither the Post Office nor the
Crown produced a single expert witness. The burden of justifying publication
realistically fell upon the publishers.
In both countries, the defense leaned heavily upon expert witnesses. In the
United States, Grove Press called two expert witnesses at the Post Office
hearing: Malcolm Cowley and Alfred Kazin, prominent literary critics. 48 It
sought to show through these two witnesses Lawrence's stature as a writer,
and more significantly, the liberalization in recent years of the community's
standards with respect to literature. The Postmaster General, in his opinion,
acknowledged that this testimony was "relevant and competent," but he
brushed it aside as "advisory only."'49 It must be said that the testimony of
these witnesses carries little impact when read in cold print-the basis on
which the Postmaster General decided the case. Their testimony was in-
terspersed with numerous objections by Post Office counsel; neither witness
was allowed to present a sustained exposition of his opinion; and the testi-
mony was simply not sufficiently detailed to persuade.
What made the defense in England extraordinary was the imaginative use
of expert witnesses. Invoking its statutory right to call expert testimony to
prove the qualities of a work in connection with the "justification" defense, the
defendant called the astonishing total of thirty-five expert witnesses, including
E.M. Forster; Dame Rebecca West; Stephen Potter; Cecil Day Lewis, the
poet and critic; professors of literature at Cambridge, Oxford, Nottingham,
Leicester, and Liverpool Universities; C.V. Wedgewood, the noted historian;
the Bishop of Woolwich and Canon Milford, Master of the Temple; editors
and literary critics from England's leading newspapers; the member of Parlia-
ment who introduced the Obscenity Act; an educational psychologist; the
Provost of King's College, Cambridge; the headmaster of a boys' grammar
school and the classics mistress of a girls' grammar school; and others. The
parade of some of the most prominent persons in English intellectual life made
the case a cause celebre in England.
46. The Trial at 18.
47. Transcript of Hearing, pp. 27-28, In the Matter of Grove Press Inc., Post Office
Docket M-16 (1959).
48. Id. at 68, 122.
49. Departmental Decision, note 22 supra.
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The testimony of these experts, as Penguin pointed out somewhat ruefully
after the trial, constituted "probably the most thorough and expensive seminar
on Lawrence's work ever given."r10 That is precisely what the testimony was:
a brilliant, provocative, highly sophisticated series of statements on the mean-
ing of the book, its symbolism, Lawrence's intentions in writing it, its merit as
a work of art, its place in English literature and in Lawrence's writings, and
so on.
Certain themes recur through the testimony of these witnesses: Lawrence
was a great and gifted writer; Lady Chatterley's Lover is a sincere and
honest book; far from exalting promiscuity, Lawrence regarded the sexual
act with a kind of reverence; the four-letter words and the descriptions of the
sexual act were relevant to a legitimate artistic purpose; the book contains
many passages of poetic beauty. No one can assess the impact of this testi-
mony with certainty, but its effect must have been enormous, particularly since
the prosecution did not produce a single countervailing expert. The prosecu-
tion sought to explain this omission by noting that it had conceded at the
outset that the work had literary merit. 1 The prosecution resorted to a
familiar technique in dealing with the experts for the defense-it urged the
jury to dismiss them as lacking in common sense.52 Anticipating this tactic,
the defense was at pains to elicit from the various witnesses testimony show-
ing that they were men of affairs, that they had children, and that they were
not persons "living a rarefied life."' ' 3 The trial judge gave the jury the usual
admonition with respect to expert testimony--"our criminal law in this coun-
try is based upon the view that a jury takes of the facts and not upon the
view that experts may have" 4-but it is doubtful, to say the least, that this
remark dispelled the aura created in the courtroom by the procession of dis-
tinguished witnesses. The jury returned a general verdict of not guilty. There
is, therefore, no way of knowing whether it concluded that the book was not
obscene, or whether it felt that its merits so outweighed the obscenity that
it was in the public good that it be published.
The American prototype for the English trial, and perhaps the only pro-
ceeding remotely comparable to it, was not the case in this country involving
Lady Chatterley's Lover, but the 1943 action by the Post Office to revoke the
second class mailing privileges of Esquire Magazine on grounds that it was
50. Quoted in Sparrow, Reginaz v. Penguin Books Ltd., 18 Encounter 35 (Feb. 1962).
The costs of the defense were reportedly 13,000 pounds, or approximately $36,400. The
Trial at 249.
51. The Trial at 208.
52. "I do suggest that they [the expert witnesses] have got what in Scotland is said to
be a bee in their bonnet about this matter, and indeed, when one sees and hears some of
them launching themselves at the first opportunity, with the first question that is asked of
them, into a sermon or a lecture, according to their vocations in this world, with apostolic
fervour, as they did, one cannot help feeling that, sincerely and honestly as they feel, they
feel in such a way that common sense perhaps has gone by the board." The Trial at 213.
53. The Trial at 177-78.
54. The Trial at 226.
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obscene. 55 At the administrative hearing, Bruce Bromley, counsel for Esquire,
summoned as expert witnesses H.L. Mencken; Channing Pollock, the play-
wright; Raymond Gram Swing, the radio commentator; the Secretary of the
New England Watch and Ward Society; psychiatrists associated with Harv-
ard and Yale Universities; the principal of a private school in Chicago;
clergymen; a Columbia University professor of education; executives of ad-
vertising agencies; and a host of others. 56 Bromley would show the witnesses
cartoons, drawings, or jokes from Esquire to which the Post Office had
excepted, and he would propound conclusory questions such as these: "Do
you see anything in that which is obscene, lewd, lascivious, indecent, or
filthy? Do you think it has any tendency to corrupt morals or to lower the
standards of right and wrong in an average person? Do you see anything in
it which would stimulate improper sexual thoughts ?"'5 Bromley demolished
the case against Esquire by a masterful use of humor and ridicule. He made
the Post Office appear priggish, humorless, and preposterously out of step
with contemporary mores. Humor-a tremendously effective but an extremely
risky technique in a proceeding of this type-was an asset not available to
counsel for Lady Chatterley's Lover. Wit was not one of Lawrence's strong
points; the novel is deadly serious.
The rhetoric of the defense of Lady Chatterley's Lover in both countries
was indignation against censorship; the appeal was to enlightenment and
tolerance. It was an appeal appropriate to the work under attack. Manifestly,
however, the rhetoric and techniques used in defending Lady Chatterle3s
Lover cannot be employed in defending the more typical obscenity case, for
example, the prosecution of a vendor of so-called "hard core" pornography-
the "filthy bawdy muck that is just filth for filth's sake."' s After all, Lawrence
was a world famous author; critics of the first rank were ready and willing to
attest to the merit of the book. Experts of this character are simply not avail-
able in the ordinary obscenity case. No expert can be summoned to defend
the "artistic merit" of a French postcard or the "literary merit" of a magazine
addressed to homosexuals. The defense of Lady Chatterley's Lover is, there-
fore, not a model for all obscenity cases. Indeed, it has been suggested in
England that Regina v. Penguin may magnify the difficulties of the defense
in future cases involving controversial books of some but lesser merit than
Lady Chatterley's Lover by authors less well known than Lawrence, for the
reason that judges and jurors will expect a comparable procession of ex-
perts.
59
55. Esquire v. Walker, 151 F.2d 49 (D.C. Cir. 1945), aff'd sub norn. Hannegan v.
Esquire, 327 U.S. 146 (1946).
56. Transcript of Record, Esquire v. Walker, 151 F.2d 49 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
57. Transcript of Record, id. at pp. 54 et seq.
58. Regina v. Martin Secker & Warburg, [1954] 1 W.L.R. 1138, 1143.
59. Clark, Obscenity, The Law and Lady Chatterley-II, CIm. L. REv. (Eng.) 224,
233 (1961).
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In a concurring opinion in Snith v. California,60 Justice Frankfurter con-
cluded that a party charged with obscenity has a constitutional right "to en-
lighten the judgment of the tribunal, be it the jury or as in this case the judge,
regarding the prevailing literary and moral community standards and to do
so through qualified experts."6 1 In his view, denial of an opportunity to
present expert testimony deprives the accused of the right to defend himself
and consequently violates due process. Justice Frankfurter observed that
"community standards or the psychological or physiological consequences of
questioned literature can as a matter of fact hardly be established except
through experts."6 2 He explicitly adverted in this connection to the English
statute permitting expert testimony as to literary and other merits.
63
But assuming that experts are competent, what is the permissible scope of
the expert testimony? Indeed, who is an expert with respect to "prevailing
literary and moral community standards ?"
The trial judge in Regina v. Penguin made a number of important rulings
concerning the allowable range of expert testimony. He ruled that "it is not
open to the defense to call evidence to prove that there was no intention
[by the author] to deprave or corrupt."64 He held that while the defense could
adduce evidence that publication was in the interests of learning or literature,
the experts could not go on to testify that publication was for the common
good; that ultimate issue was for the jury.65 In addition, the court ruled that
the defense could not call witnesses to show what effect the book might have
on the ordinary reader.66 The defense, in other words, was foreclosed from
calling psychiatrists or other expertg to show that reading does not "deprave
or corrupt."
Justice Frankfurter indicated, however, that it would be open to a defendant
in this country to call experts to prove the "psychological or physiological
consequences of questioned literature." In light of this opinion, the defense
could call psychiatrists or psychologists to testify that there is no proof that
reading will alter an individual's character structure or stimulate a person to
immoral behavior. 67 Experts of this nature might well be vital to the defense
in the more typical obscenity case.
III
A basic question discussed in England, where the case has inspired lively
and continuing debate, 68 is whether the judicial process is appropriate for
60. 361 U.S. 147,161 (1959).
61. Id. at 164-65. See also Lockhart & McClure, Censorship of Obscenity: The De-
veloping Constitutional Standards, 45 MicH. L. REv. 5, 98-99 (1960).
62, Ibid.
63. Id. at 166-67.
64. The Trial at 127.
65. Id. at 127-28.
66. Id. at 127; see also id. at 203-04.
67. See United States v. Roth, 237 F.2d 796, 812-17 (2d Cir. 1956) (App., per Frank,
J.).
68, See, e.g., The Censor as Aedile, The London Times Literary Supplement, Aug. 4,
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resolving issues of literary merit. The question would have been posed even
more sharply had the prosecution created a conflict in the testimony by
presenting its own experts.69 Is it not anomalous, it is asked, to leave to twelve
laymen the resolution of questions which may deeply divide informed authori-
ties? An assessment of a work's literary merit involves value judgments which
are far removed from judgments on questions of fact which are customarily
confided to jurors. Given the first amendment, there is a further paradox in
the use of juries in this country. The jury is deemed to be a cross-section of
the community, reflecting average views. But freedom of expression means
the right to express the unusual, the unconventional, and even the distasteful.
Is it consonant with this view to relegate resolution of the question to a
societal instrument which is designed to mirror the view of the average man?
Judge Learned Hand has given the classic response to these questions:
[S]hould not the word "obscene" be allowed to indicate the present
critical point in the compromise between candor and shame at which the
community may have arrived here and now? If letters must, like other
kinds of conduct, be subject to the social sense of what is right, it would
seem that a jury should in each case establish the standard much as they
do in cases of negligence.70
As so often happens, the problem is to find a passable compromise be-
tween opposing interests, whose relative importance, like that of all social
or personal values, is incommensurable. We impose such a duty upon
a jury . . . because the standard they fix is likely to be an acceptable
mesne, and because in such matters a mesne most nearly satisfies the
moral demands of the community. There can never be constitutive princi-
ples for such judgments, or indeed more than cautions to avoid the
personal aberrations of the jurors .... Thus, "obscenity" is a function of
many variables, and the verdict of the jury is not the conclusion of a
syllogism of which they are to find only the minor premise, but really
a small bit of legislation ad hoc, like the standard of care.71
There is finally the problem presented by the ambiguity of the phrase "liter-
ary merit." The English statute does not define these words. The trial judge
in the Penguin case asked one of the expert witnesses, Dr. Vivian Pinto,
Professor of English at Nottingham University, what he understood the
phrase to mean. Dr. Pinto's thoughtful response underscores the immense
practical difficulties in judicially administering such a test:
1961, p. 475; Welch, Black Magic, White Lies, 16 Encounter 75 (February 1961); West,
Williams, Hoggart, & Jarrett-Kerr, 'Lady Chatterley,' the Witnesses, and the Law, 16
Encounter 52 (March 1961) ; Williams, The Law and Literary Merit, 17 Encounter 66
(Sept. 1961) ; Sparrow, Regina v. Penguin, 18 Encounter 35 (Feb. 1962).
69. It has been reported that the prosecution asked T.S. Eliot to testify in its behalf,
and that he responded by offering his services to the defense. MacDonald, London Letter,
28 PARTISAN REv. 248,254 (1961).
70. United States v. Kennerley, 209 Fed. 119, 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1913).
71. United States v. Levine, 83 F.2d 156, 157 (2d Cir. 1936).
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It is not easy to put in a few words. I look for a number of things in a
book. I look for the quality of the writing, for the importance of the sub-
ject matter, the meaning of the book, whether it has a true and valid
meaning; the experience that lies behind it is important, and whether the
artistry, the craftsmanship, is adequate, and whether it succeeds in convey-
ing the author's experience, and whether that experience is a significant
experience, and I think what is called the longimanous test is a good test,
when you come back to it and get fresh pleasure from it, and I did that.72
But troublesome as the "literary merit" exception may be, a test of obscenity
which did not furnish immunity for such classics as Lysistrata, Fielding's
Tom Jones, or Madame Bovary, or for contemporary works of distinction,
would be intolerable. As the late Judge Jerome Frank put it: "A statute
yielding such deprivation would not only be laughably absurd but would
squarely oppose the intention of the cultivated men who framed and adopted
the first amendment."73 The real difficulty, of course, arises in deciding whether
contemporary works have "literary merit." It is a relatively easy task to estab-
lish that works by Rabelais or Zola are literature.
In this country, the Lady Chatterley case belongs with the Ulysses decision
as a landmark in upholding literary freedom. It marks a reaffirmation of
judicial hostility toward administrative censorship. In England, Lord Rad-
cliffe has suggested that Regina v. Penguin may mark "a final turning away
from the older idea that written words can be things dangerous enough in them-
selves to merit punishment for the man who has let them loose on society."
'74
The recent prosecutions against booksellers of Henry Miller's Tropic of Can-
cer 75 and the refusal by New York State film censors to license a motion pic-
ture on drug addiction because of its use of a four-letter word 76 suggest that
this view may be unduly sanguine, at least so far as the United States is con-
cerned. In any event, the two cases resulted in judicial vindication of the artistic
integrity of D.H. Lawrence.
The impression which survives a scrutiny of these two proceedings is that
obscenity is an "exquisitely vague" concept, 7 that the social evils which
obscenity legislation is designed to suppress are not easy to pinpoint, and that
the defense of obscenity charges calls for imaginative, and even heroic, efforts
by the defense. Lawrence himself may have pointed to the root of all these
difficulties when he perceptively observed that "What is pornography to one
man is the laughter of genius to another."78  ABE KRASH t
72. The Trial at 83.
73. United States v. Roth, 237 F2d.796, 820 (2d Cir. 1956).
74. RADCLIFFE, CENSORS 20 (1961).
75. See Lewis, The Most Recent Troubles of 'Tropic': A Chapter it Censorship, N.Y.
Times Book Review, January 21, 1962, p. 4, col. 3.
76. See Crowther, Choice of Words, N.Y. Times, February 11, 1962, § 2, p. 1, col. 8.
77. The phrase is Judge Frank's, United States v. Roth, 237 F.2d 796, 826 (2d Cir.
1956).
78. Lawrence, Pornography and Obscenity, in LAWRENCE, SELECTED LirERAR CRrr-
cism 32 (1955).
tMember of the District of Columbia Bar.
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